10/29/2009
Kaczynski v. Kaczynski - SC18235 ("Our resolution of this appeal makes clear that when a trial court opinion is silent as to the standard of proof applied, an appellate court is not the proper forum to first raise a claim that the trial court applied the wrong standard when that claim could have been raised in, and more fairly remedied by, a motion for articulation or reargument.") 10/26/2009State v. Fernando A. - SC18045, SC18103 ("In this public interest appeal, we consider the nature of the hearing that a defendant must receive prior to the issuance of a criminal protective order in a family violence case (criminal protective order) pursuant to General Statutes § 54-63c (b).")
10/1/2009
Below are the family law Appellate Court opinions issued in September 2009:
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AC30125 — Buehler v. Buehler (“In this dissolution of marriage action, the plaintiff. . . appeals from the orders of the trial court relating to alimony and custody and support of the parties’ three minor children. On appeal, the plaintiff makes numerous claims as to the propriety of the court’s orders that were issued on two different dates. The defendant...argues that the plaintiff’s appeal is untimely as to many of those claims. The anomalous circumstances of this case, with its motion laden file, compel us to first set out its facts and procedural history before discussing those claims in detail or determining the extent to which the plaintiff’s appeal is timely.”)
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AC28172, AC30037 — Collins v. Collins [Dissolution of Marriage] (“These two appeals arise from the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. In AC 28172, the defendant...appeals from the trial court’s pendente lite order granting the plaintiff. . .exclusive possession of the marital home. In AC 30037, the defendant appeals from the final judgment of dissolution. We dismiss the appeal in AC 28172 and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 30037.”)
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AC29257 — Hannon v. Redler [Dissolution of Marriage] (“The defendant. . .appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. . . . On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) determined the value of his interest in his medical practice, (2) determined the net equity in his home, (3) determined his income and (4) ordered alimony and a distribution of assets to the plaintiff.”)
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AC29259, AC29460, AC29865, AC30190 — LaBossiere v. Jones [Dissolution of Marriage] (“A decision to award counsel fees in a marital dissolution dispute ordinarily is based on an appraisal of the respective financial ability of each party to pay his or her own fees. See General Statutes § 46b-62; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 500–501, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980). Where, however, ‘a party has engaged in egregious litigation misconduct that has required the other party to expend significant amounts of money for attorney’s fees, and where the court determines, in its discretion, that the misconduct has not been addressed adequately by other orders of the court, the court has discretion to award attorney’s fees to compensate for the harm caused by that misconduct, irrespective of whether the other party has ample liquid assets and of whether the lack of such an award would undermine the court’s other financial orders.’ Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 357, 915 A.2d 790 (2007); see also General Statutes § 46b-87.”)
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AC29590 — Taylor v. Taylor (“The defendant, Elinor J. Taylor, appeals from the postjudgment order of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff, Marvin J. Taylor, for modification of his alimony obligation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) interpreted the ‘second look’ aspect of the alimony provision in the separation agreement as a de novo postjudgment review and (2) reduced her alimony in contravention of the principles of trust law and considered the trust’s income or appreciation in deciding the plaintiff’s motion for modification.”) 9/2/2009
Below are the family law Appellate Court opinions issued in August 2009:
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AC29538 — Rozsa v. Rozsa [Dissolution of Marriage] (“The plaintiff… appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant…. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that, in fashioning its financial orders, the court improperly determined his net income and abused its discretion by (1) ordering him to pay alimony and support that exceeded his income, (2) assigning the defendant a majority of the marital assets while assigning him a majority of the marital debt and liabilities, (3) awarding the defendant alimony and (4) awarding the defendant attorney’s fees and expert witness fees.”)
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AC29223 — Spilke v. Spilke [Dissolution of Marriage] (“The plaintiff…appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for contempt and to open and to vacate the judgment dissolving her marriage to the defendant…. In her postjudgment motion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently misrepresented certain information on the financial affidavits that he submitted prior to and at the time of the dissolution. On appeal, she claims that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion because she presented evidence of fraud sufficient to open the judgment.”)
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AC30459 — Jayne S. v. Kyle S. (“The defendant, Kyle S., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a restraining order filed by the pro se plaintiff, Jayne S., pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-15. He claims that the court abused its discretion in so doing because no factual basis existed to support the requisite finding that he presented a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury to the plaintiff and her boyfriend, Joseph K.”)
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AC29593 — McMellon v. McMellon [Dissolution of Marriage] (“In this marital dissolution action, the defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court with respect to the court’s financial orders. The defendant claims that the court improperly awarded (1) lifetime alimony to the plaintiff and (2) $15,000 in attorney’s fees.”)
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AC29919 — Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons [Dissolution of Marriage] (“In this marital dissolution action, the defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court with respect to the court’s financial orders. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) modifying the marital property division postjudgment and (2) awarding the plaintiff…relief not claimed by her at trial.”) 7/10/2009Mickey v. Mickey - SC18126 (“The principal issue in this appeal is whether disability benefits awarded under General Statutes § 5-192p1 as a result of a disability incurred after a marriage has been dissolved constitute distributable marital property under General Statutes § 46b-81.2 The defendant... appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying his motion for clarification of that court’s financial orders, pursuant to which the plaintiff, Jacqueline Mickey, was granted 40 percent of the defendant’s monthly retirement benefits. On appeal, the defendant claims that, in denying his motion for clarification, the trial court improperly concluded that it had authority under § 46b-81 to distribute the defendant’s potential disability benefits at the time of dissolution. Specifically, the defendant contends that his disability benefits did not constitute distributable property under § 46b-81 because, at the time of dissolution, such benefits were no more than a mere expectancy and not a sufficiently concrete interest. The defendant also asserts that his disability benefits are not distributable because they were not actually awarded until after the date of dissolution, and they represent a substitute for lost wages rather than deferred compensation.”)
6/30/2009
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AC29862 - Celini v. Celini
[Child Support] “The defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the postjudgment motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff…. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) found him liable for certain extracurricular activity and college expenses of his children, (2) found him in contempt and (3) awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff.”
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AC30430 - Clark v. Clark
[Dissolution of Marriage] “In this matter, we are asked to address the right of former counsel to intervene as a party in a marital dissolution action. The proposed intervenor, the law firm of Rutkin and Oldham, LLC (Rutkin), appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to intervene as a party defendant. We raised the question on the court’s own motion of whether the appeal should be dismissed for lack of a final judgment because the proposed intervenor cannot make a colorable claim to intervention as a matter of right.”
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AC29274 - Dionne v. Dionne
[Child Support] “The determinative issue in this appeal is whether a trial court properly may continue a hearing on a motion for contempt when the alleged contemnor’s attorney represents to the court that the court-ordered child support payment is ‘in the mail.’”
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AC29063 - Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld
[Dissolution of Marriage] “Trial courts have inherent power to manage their caseloads in order to achieve the expeditious disposition of cases. See Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 819, 817 A.2d 628 (2003); In re Mongillo, 190 Conn. 686, 691, 461 A.2d 1387 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999). Accordingly, a defendant’s constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his choice does not grant a defendant an unlimited opportunity to obtain alternate counsel on the eve of trial. See State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 725, 631 A.2d 288 (1993). The dispositive issue in this marital dissolution case is whether these principles govern the defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his last minute motion for a continuance to enable him to come to this state from Antigua to act as his own counsel in substitution for prior counsel of his choice.”
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AC29863 - Senk v. Senk
[Dissolution of Marriage] “The defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a limited contested trial, dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff…. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) failed to recuse itself from the case after hearing another matter involving the defendant, (2) failed to take into account the evidence in the record as a whole and (3) allowed the submission of evidence that was irrelevant and prejudicial to the defendant.”
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AC30812 - Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler
[Dissolution of Marriage] “This appeal arises from the judgment of the trial court dissolving the parties’ marriage. The defendant…claims that the court improperly denied his motions to continue the dissolution trial until after the disposition of a pending criminal case charging him with intentionally setting fire to property owned by the plaintiff…. He argues that the court’s denials deprived him of the opportunity to present a defense in the dissolution action, thereby depriving him of his constitutional due process rights, because he invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” 6/15/2009Perricone v. Perricone - SC17683 (Dissolution of marriage; "The defendant appeals from the order of the trial court enforcing the confidentiality agreement and restraining her from disseminating any information pertaining to her divorce from the plaintiff or any derogatory or defamatory information about the parties. The defendant claims that: (1) the parties’ separation agreement was fully integrated and, therefore, it nullified the confidentiality agreement; (2) even if the confidentiality agreement was not nullified, the trial court’s order constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on her freedom of speech in violation of the first amendment to the United States constitution; (3) even if the order does not violate the first amendment, it violates article first, §§ 4 and 5, of the constitution of Connecticut;(4) the confidentiality agreement is void as violating public policy; and (5) the confidentiality agreement is void for indefiniteness.") Isham v. Isham- SC18270 (Dissolution of marriage; "The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that the alimony provision in the parties’ separation agreement (agreement) was clear and unambiguous and did not include the defendant’s bonuses. She also claims that the trial court improperly refused to permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence concerning the parties’ intent with respect to the alimony provision.") 6/1/2009
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AC28711 - Dougan v. Dougan
[Dissolution of Marriage] “The question raised by this appeal is whether the provision of a stipulated judgment requiring the payment of interest, upon default, from the date of the stipulated judgment to the date of default is enforceable. The defendant…claims that the court improperly (1) held such a provision of her stipulated dissolution judgment unenforceable and (2) refused to enforce the provision that it previously had found fair and equitable.”
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AC28847 - Malave v. Ortiz
[Child Custody] “This appeal, arising under Practice Book (2006), § 25-26 (g), concerns the application of the probable cause standard to a request for leave to file a motion to modify a child custody order. General Statutes § 46b-56 grants the trial court the authority to render orders concerning custody. Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Conn. App. 50, 55, 732 A.2d 808 (1999). Our Supreme Court has limited the trial court’s broad discretion to modify custody, requiring that a modification order be based on ‘either a material change of circumstances which alters the court’s finding of the best interests of the child . . . or a finding that the custody order sought to be modified was not based upon the best interests of the child.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The trial court’s guiding principle in modifying any order with respect to custody is the best interest of the child. See Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813, 824, 949 A.2d 557 (2008).”
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AC26999 - Feinberg v. Feinberg
[Child Custody] “The defendant…appeals from the postdissolution order of the trial court granting the plaintiff…physical custody of the parties’ minor child. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly relied on outdated evidence and factually unsupported findings to determine that the best interest of the child would be served by primarily residing with the plaintiff and attending Simsbury public schools.”
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AC29059 - Kennedy v. Kennedy
“A judgment of civil contempt is improper if ‘the contemnor, through no fault of his own, was unable to obey the court’s order.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 692, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). Accordingly, ‘a court may not find a person in contempt without considering the circumstances surrounding the violation to determine whether such violation was wilful.’ Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn. App. 263, 275–76, 661 A.2d 621 (1995). In this highly contentious family litigation, the plaintiff’s principal claim on appeal is that, because protective and restraining orders prohibited him from having ‘any contact in any manner’ with the defendant, his former wife, the trial court improperly found that he wilfully had failed to honor his obligation to notify her that he had obtained employment.”
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AC28699 - Ucci v. Ucci
"The defendant…appeals from the postjudgment order of the trial court denying his motion for modification of alimony payments to the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly based its determination on the criteria set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-86 and 46b-82 rather than the criterion for modification set forth in the parties’ separation agreement as incorporated into the judgment of dissolution."
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AC29853 - Barber v. Barber
[Child Support] "Although Connecticut generally permits a creditor to enforce a money judgment against any property of the adjudged debtor; see General Statutes § 52-350f; most family support judgments are exempt from this rule. See General Statutes § 52-350a (13). Accordingly, our Supreme Court has held that a family support judgment that is based on a stipulated agreement by the parties 'is to be regarded and construed as a contract.' Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 109, 570 A.2d 690 (1990). The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court properly relied on these governing principles in concluding that a former spouse may not enforce a judgment incorporating a stipulated agreement for child support without introducing evidence of the arrearage allegedly outstanding and unpaid." 5/4/2009
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AC29338 - Johnson v. Clark
“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly concluded that the family support magistrate did not exceed his authority when he continued the matter of a contempt citation for purposes of monitoring the compliance of the defendant after he paid the purge amount and (2) the family support magistrate improperly disregarded the court’s decisional law.”
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AC28443 - Reichert v. Bronson
“The defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff…to modify a maintenance order. She claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated extreme hardship as required under New York law.”
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AC29948 - Gail R. v. Bubbico
“The defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a restraining order filed by the plaintiff…pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-15, for the protection of the plaintiff and her sons. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court’s order constituted an abuse of discretion because there was insufficient evidence before the court to find that he presented a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, within the meaning of the statute, to the plaintiff or her to sons.” 4/20/2009
Harris v. Harris - SC17897 ("On appeal, the defendant asserts that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed his appeal from the order of the trial court finding him in contempt for lack of a final judgment.") 3/31/2009
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AC28693 - Gyerko v. Gyerko
[Dissolution of marriage] (“The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) found that the parties owned an apartment in Romania worth $35,000 to $40,000, (2) failed to find that the plaintiff, Maricica Gyerko, owned property in Romania, (3) found that each party contributed $50,000 to the purchase of the marital home, (4) found that the plaintiff contributed $48,000 to paying down the mortgage on the marital home, (5) considered factors listed in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 and (6) precluded testimony from his witness.”)
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AC28497 - Auerbach v. Auerbach
[Dissolution of marriage] (“The plaintiff…appeals from the postjudgment orders of the trial court denying her motion for contempt and granting the motion of the defendant…for modification of his unallocated alimony and child support obligations. The plaintiff claims that the court (1) lacked the authority to grant the modification because the defendant failed to comply with conditions precedent set forth in the parties’ separation agreement as incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, (2) improperly failed to find the defendant in contempt, (3) improperly granted the defendant’s motion for modification and (4) improperly entered orders on the basis of the defendant’s gross income rather than his net income.”)
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AC28838 - Lederle v. Spivey
(“In this dissolution of marriage action, the defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) permitted the plaintiff…to relocate with their minor child to Virginia, (2) ordered him to pay a penalty for missed visitations, (3) awarded sole legal and physical custody to the plaintiff and (4) ordered him to maintain life insurance beyond the child’s attainment of the age of majority.”)
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AC28904 - Pellow v. Pellow
[Dissolution of marriage] (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) made a factual finding concerning the plaintiff’s disability, (2) made financial orders under General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 that were excessive, (3) awarded child support and (4) ordered a property division of the marital home.”)
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AC29201 - Wallbeoff v. Wallbeoff
[Dissolution of marriage] (“In this appeal from the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, we examine the parameters of the appellant’s burden to create an adequate record for our review. The plaintiff…appeals from the judgment of the trial court solely as to the financial orders, claiming that the court abused its discretion by improperly deviating from the statutory child support guidelines when it issued financial orders without first making the specific factual findings required by § 46b-215a-3 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. See also General Statutes § 46b-215a (establishing guidelines).”)
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AC29065 - Marlow v. Starkweather
[Dissolution of marriage] (“The plaintiff…appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant…on her postjudgment motion preventing the plaintiff from displaying certain photographs in any residence in which the parties’ children reside or visit. On appeal, the plaintiff raises five issues relating to this judgment.”)
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AC28189 - State v. McCarroll ("The pro se defendant, Douglas R. McCarroll, appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court affirming the decision of the family support magistrate denying his motions to open and to set aside certain paternity judgments. The court concluded that the claims contained therein were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.") 3/2/2009
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AC28780 - Utz v. Utz
[Dissolution of Marriage] “On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the court’s financial orders and awards, claiming that the court improperly (1) constructed a property division and support award with which he cannot comply, (2) calculated child support, (3) calculated the alimony award, (4) ordered him to pay counsel fees for the children and guardian ad litem, and (5) ordered him to contribute to the plaintiff’s counsel fees.” 1/30/2009
Below are the family law Appellate Court opinions issued in January 2009:
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AC29280 — Gamble-Perugini v. Perugini
[Dissolution of Marriage] “On appeal, the defendant claims that the court’s alimony, property disposition and educational support orders were improper.”
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AC28996 — Boyne v. Boyne
[Dissolution of Marriage] “On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) determined his earning capacity, (2) required him to obtain life insurance in the absence of any evidence as to its cost or availability, (3) ordered him obtain a bond to secure the payment of his child support and alimony obligations, (4) allocated tax exemptions, (5) determined his obligation of unreimbursed medical expenses and day care expenses, (6) declared that all of the financial orders in the judgment were in the nature of support and not dischargeable in bankruptcy and (7) ordered him to transfer custodianship of the children’s educational accounts to the plaintiff.”
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AC28716 — Zoll v. Zoll
“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) entered several improper orders prior to disposing of his motion to modify alimony, (2) improperly sustained the plaintiff’s objection to his requests for admission, (3) rendered an improper judgment on his motion to modify alimony and (4) improperly found him in contempt of court.” 1/5/2009
Below is the family law Appellate Court opinion issued in December 2008:
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AC29354 - Jones v. Jones
“The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) opened the judgment, (2) concluded that paragraph twelve of the stipulated judgment of dissolution was ambiguous, (3) concluded that his accrued leave at the time of dissolution was property subject to division between the parties and (4) concluded that the dissolution judgment was manifestly unfair without considering the totality of the circumstances. The record is inadequate for us to review the plaintiff’s claims, and, thus, we affirm the judgment.” 12/1/2008
Below are the family law Appellate Court opinions issued in November 2008:
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AC28688 - Picton v. Picton (“In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff. . .appeals from the judgment of the trial court with respect to the court’s financial orders. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion by ordering (1) a division of property that was unreasonable, inequitable and inconsistent with the court’s factual findings, (2) the plaintiff to pay to the defendant. . . an unreasonable amount of interest from the date of judgment until the plaintiff is able to sell certain property and (3) the plaintiff to pay to the defendant alimony in the amount of $20,800 each year for a period of seven years.”)
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AC28927, AC29057 - Johnson v. Johnson (“In AC 28927, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion when it (1) admitted hearsay during a hearing on the motion for contempt, (2) found him in contempt of the court’s orders and (3) ordered him to secure the services of a therapist to effect compliance with the orders. In AC 29057, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion when, after finding continued noncompliance with its orders, it ordered him to schedule psychological evaluations.”) 11/10/2008Kenny v. Banks - SC17982 (Child Support; Contempt; "The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without first hearing testimony and making factual findings in support of its conclusion that jurisdiction over the defendant was lacking under the long arm statute.") 10/31/2008
Below is the family law Appellate Court opinion issued in October 2008:
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AC28760 - Gil v. Gil (“The plaintiff argues that the court improperly (1) ordered attorney’s fees for the contempt finding that were greatly in excess of the defendant’s retainer agreement and (2) awarded excessive attorney’s fees for the work performed for the first appeal in the litigation between the parties.”) 10/20/2008
Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz- SC18082 (Dissolution of marriage; claim that mandatory parenting education program required by statute § 46b-69b is an "unconstitutional infringement on a parent’s fundamental right to exercise care, control and custody over his or her child"; whether claim was moot because trial court ultimately waived requirement of participation in parenting program.) 10/10/2008Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health - SC17716 (Same Sex Marriage; Whether Prohibition of Marriage Between Same Sex Couples Violates Equal Protection and Due Process Guarantees of Connecticut Constitution.)
6/23/2008
Finan v. Finan- SC17918 ( Dissolution of marriage; distribution of parties' marital property pursuant to statute (§46b-81); claim that trial court improperly refused to admit into evidence report detailing defendant's dissipation of marital assets prior to parties' separation; conclusion that trial court, in fashioning financial orders in dissolution cases, may consider party's preseparation dissipation of marital assets for purposes of equitable property distribution under §46b-81). 3/24/2008
The following Supreme Court Opinion was released today:
Testa v. Geressy - SC17970
[docket summary] [Motion to dismiss; standing; whether attorney general and support enforcement services have standing under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to litigate in Connecticut on behalf of out-of-state resident to enforce child support order; whether out-of-state child support order terminated prior to registration in Connecticut]
1/7/2008
There was one Connecticut Supreme Court opinion released today:
- Fish v. Fish - SC17500 (Joint Custody; third party visitation; temporary custody and neglect statutes, § 46b-129 and § 46b- 120; "In this postdissolution child custody proceeding, the issue before the court is whether a third party must satisfy the jurisdictional pleading requirements and burden of persuasion articulated in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 234–35, (2002), when seeking the custody of a minor child over the objection of a fit parent".)
12/6/2007In re Leah S. - SC17737
(Child custody; contempt; certification from Appellate Court; claim that department of children and families improperly had been found in contempt of court for failure to comply with specific steps issued by trial court to facilitate child's reunification with family and to ensure child's safety). |
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