2/9/2010
- Duty of Mental Health Professionals to Warn of Potentially Violent Conduct by Patients - 2010-R-0024
You asked whether mental health professionals have a duty to warn law enforcement officials or potential victims of potentially violent conduct by patients. This report updates the Connecticut portion of OLR report 98-R-0682.
- Connecticut and New Hampshire ATV Laws - 2010-R-0032
You asked for a summary of laws requiring all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to be registered with the state, the reasons why people oppose these laws, the reasons why people oppose allowing ATVs on state land, and an analysis of whether charging people to drive ATVs on state land could generate significant revenue for the state. You also wanted to know about New Hampshire's ATV registration laws and fees, and how the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services assesses the environmental impact of ATV use on state land. 2/8/2010
Branford v. Santa Barbara - SC18089 (Condemnation; offer of judgment; appeal; offer of judgment statute [Rev. to 2005] § 52-192a; whether offer of judgment statute applied to condemnation appeals; "These two consolidated appeals, as well as the two companion cases also decided today; see Branford v. Santa Barbara, 294 Conn. 803, A.2d (2010); New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, A.2d (2010); arise from the exercise of eminent domain by the defendant town of Branford (town), with respect to an approximately seventy-seven acre parcel of land, known as 48-86 Tabor Drive, in the south central area of town".)
Branford v. Santa Barbara - SC18090 (Eminent domain; "The owners claim that the court improperly concluded, on the basis of its determination that the offer of judgment statute conflicts with General Statutes § 8-130, which specifically limits the award of prejudgment interest in condemnation cases, that § 52- 192a cannot be utilized in a condemnation appeal. The owners contend that the eminent domain statutory scheme can be read harmoniously with § 52-192a, and that failure to apply § 52-192a to condemnation appeals would run contrary to that statute’s well established purpose of encouraging pretrial settlements.")
New England Estates, LLC v. Branford - SC18132 ("In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983 action), the town appeals from the judgment rendered, following a jury trial, in favor of the cited in defendants, Thomas Santa Barbara, Jr., and Frank Perrotti, Jr., the owners of the subject property at the time of the taking (owners), and the plaintiff, New England Estates, LLC (New England Estates) a developer that had entered into an option contract with the owners to purchase the property.") State v. Winot - SC17696 (Kidnapping in second degree in violation of § 53a-94 (a); attempt to commit kidnapping in second degree in violation of § 53a-94 (a); risk of injury to child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1); whether Appellate Court improperly concluded that § 53a-94 [a] was unconstitutionally vague.)
Costantino v. Skolnick - SC18327 (Medical malpractice; offer of judgment statute [Rev. to 2005] § 52-192a; declaratory judgment; "The plaintiff sought the declaration after the parties had entered into a settlement agreement (agreement) that required ProMutual to pay Skolnick’s $1 million policy limit to the plaintiff and under which they stipulated that: (1) the agreement was to be considered a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for purposes of the offer of judgment statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a; and (2) the plaintiff would have been entitled to offer of judgment interest had the case been tried to conclusion.")
Eight Connecticut Appellate Court opinions are scheduled to be released today. See the Connecticut Judicial Branch website for the list of case names and links to the full text of the opinions. After today, the opinions will be available from the Appellate Court Archive. 2/5/2010
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"The statutory method for collection of unpaid real estate taxes with which this case is concerned is the public auction, or ‘tax sale,’ pursuant to General Statutes § 12-157, as amended by Public Act No. 95-228 § 3. Unlike a statutory tax foreclosure; General Statutes §§ 12-181, 12-182; or a civil action in debt to collect the tax; General Statutes § 12-161; a public auction of real estate pursuant to General Statutes § 12-157 is entirely extra-judicial." Pace Motor Lines, Inc. v. Biagiarelli, Superior Court, Judicial District of Bridgeport, Docket No. 318117S, 17 Conn.L.Rptr. 77 (June 24, 1996).
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AC30408 - Lallier v. Zoning Board of Appeals (“This case concerns the authority of a zoning board of appeals to reexamine the merits of an earlier order of a planning and zoning commission that had approved a landowner’s plan to improve his property for agricultural purposes by large scale removal of gravel from the property. ...[The Zoning Board of Appeals maintains] that the court improperly concluded that (1) the underlying approval of the planning and zoning commission could not be collaterally attacked in a cease and desist order and (2) the agricultural operation of the plaintiff’s land that was approved by the commission authorized the plaintiff to sell his gravel.")
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Ripeness: "[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.... Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86-87, 952 A.2d 1 (2008)
Six Connecticut Appellate Court opinions, with one dissent and two memorandum decisions, are scheduled to be released today. See the Connecticut Judicial Branch website for the list of case names and links to the full text of the opinions. After today, the opinions will be available from the Appellate Court Archive. 2/2/2010
The Connecticut General Assembly (CGA) 2010 regular session begins tomorrow. To read about the issues that may be addressed in the upcoming session, see the OLR Major Issues report. Also, the CGA offers free bill tracking from its Web site. The service alerts you by email whenever there is activity affecting any of the bills you are tracking. According to the CGA, “you have the ability to add individual bills to a list, add all bills introduced by a specific Legislator or Committee, and add all bills co-sponsored by a specific Legislator.” To register, you need to provide your name and email address. For more information, see the bill tracking help page.
2/1/2010
Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works - SC18198 ("The defendant, the department of public works, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application of the plaintiff, Bacon Construction Company, Inc., to confirm an arbitration award for damages relating to a public works contract between the parties and denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the award, and from the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the application to confirm. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly accepted the arbitrator’s determination regarding the arbitrability of the plaintiff’s claims and, specifically, the arbitrator’s interpretation of General Statutes § 4-612 and conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims had been timely asserted under that statute. The defendant claims that it therefore follows that (1) the trial court and this court lack subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, (2) the plaintiff’s claims are not arbitrable, and (3) the award does not conform to the submission. The plaintiff responds that (1) the defendant is not entitled to judicial review of whether the plaintiff’s claims are arbitrable under § 4-61 because the defendant submitted the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator without objection, and (2) the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s application to confirm the award because the award conformed to the submission.")
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AC29601 - Fuller v. Fuller (“In this dissolution of marriage action, the plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court in which it determined that by the self-executing terms of the final dissolution decree, and the separation agreement incorporated therein, the court’s previous child support order was retroactive to the date alimony payments to the defendant . . . terminated. First, the plaintiff claims that the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to determine that its previous support order was retroactive by the self-executing terms of the separation agreement. Next, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly concluded that the previous order that modified his child support payments was automatically retroactive by the self-executing terms of the separation agreement that was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. Last, the plaintiff claims that the court’s determination that the previous child support order was retroactive by the self-executing terms of the separation agreement resulted in a gross injustice to him, and, therefore, principles of equity require this court to reverse that order.”)
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AC30207, AC30442 - Marshall v. Marshall (Dissolution of Marriage; “In this consolidated appeal, the defendant . . . appeals from the judgments of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff . . . and granting her motion to strike his petition for a new trial. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly: (1) precluded a future court from considering the plaintiff’s income in a motion to modify alimony, (2) fashioned its financial orders with a punitive motive, (3) failed to correct erroneous financial orders concerning the distribution of the parties’ tangible personal property and (4) granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike his petition for a new trial for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.”)
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AC29735 - Tomlinson v. Tomlinson (“The plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant . . . to modify the unallocated alimony and child support order incorporated by reference into the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and from the judgment of the court denying her motion for contempt. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly granted the motion to modify because the agreement of the parties expressly precluded modification and (2) the court improperly failed to grant her motion for contempt and awarded her an insufficient amount of attorney’s fees and costs.”)
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AC29559 - Desai v. Desai (Dissolution of Marriage; “In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant . . . . The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) ordered joint custody while (a) ordering that the defendant be the ultimate decision maker and (b) determining that the minor child’s primary residence be with the defendant, (2) made certain factual findings regarding the finances of the marital home and (3) ordered an unequal distribution of the marital assets in view of (a) a $19,000 prior contribution by the plaintiff’s parents and (b) the short length of the marriage and the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s physical violence caused the breakdown of the marriage.”)
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AC30173 - Tobet v. Tobet (“This postdissolution proceeding concerns the obligation of a parent to make financial contributions to the college education expenses of the parties’ child, pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement. The plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to allocate college expenses between the parties by enforcing the parties’ separation agreement, which was incorporated in the judgment of dissolution. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred when it (1) denied her motion requesting an allocation of college expenses based on a specific provision in the judgment of dissolution and (2) found the cost of one year of education at a particular university for which no evidence was presented.”)
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AC30267 - DeFeo v. DeFeo (“The defendant . . . appeals from the denial of her motion for contempt.”)
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AC30075 - Farkas v. Farkas (“The defendant . . . appeals from a dissolution of marriage judgment rendered by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court made incorrect factual determinations that the plantiff . . . was unable to work and that the status of his physical ailments remain unresolved. The defendant also claims that the court’s property allocation and financial awards were unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at trial.”)
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AC30948 - In re Sole S. (“The respondent father appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights as to his minor child, Sole. He claims that the court improperly found that (1) the department of children and families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with him, (2) he had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the child’s life and (3) the termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest.”)
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AC30684 - Washington v. Blackmore (“The pro se plaintiff . . . appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants . . . . Although the plaintiff raises a variety of claims, the dispositive one is whether the court, in rendering summary judgment, properly determined that Blackmore and Gonzalez possessed probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.”)
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AC29314 - Pin v. Kramer (“The plaintiffs . . . appeal from the judgment in favor of the defendants, David L. Kramer, an orthopedic surgeon, and Danbury Orthopedic Associates, P.C., following a jury trial on their medical malpractice claim. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) restricted their questioning of potential jurors during voir dire, (2) assumed the role of an advocate and interfered with the presentation of their case, examination of witnesses and cross-examination of the defendants’ expert witness, (3) refused to admit Kramer’s deposition testimony into evidence, (4) prevented them from offering rebuttal testimony regarding the defendants’ learned treatises, as well as interfered with their cross-examination by improperly finding that they lacked foundation for questions regarding the learned treatises, (5) applied the learned treatise doctrine to admit inadmissible hearsay and (6) denied their motion for a mistrial or for a curative instruction after hearing improper and harmful testimony from the defendants’ medical expert.”)
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AC30236 - Farrell v. Twenty-First Century Ins. Co. (“In this action to compel arbitration, the plaintiffs . . . appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant . . . .”)
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AC30003 - Baranowski v. Safeco Ins. Co of America (“The plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the defendant . . . . On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) declined to instruct the jury that expert testimony was not required to apply the law and (2) granted the defendant’s motion to preclude the testimony of an expert witness.”)
Below is a list of medical malpractice Appellate Court opinions issued in January 2009:
AC29314 - Pin v. Kramer ("On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) restricted their questioning of potential jurors during voir dire, (2) assumed the role of an advocate and interfered with the presentation of their case, examination of witnesses and cross-examination of the defendants’ expert witness, (3) refused to admit Kramer’s deposition testimony into evidence, (4) prevented them from offering rebuttal testimony regarding the defendants’ learned treatises, as well as interfered with their crossexamination by improperly finding that they lacked foundation for questions regarding the learned treatises, (5) applied the learned treatise doctrine to admit inadmissible hearsay and (6) denied their motion for a mistrial or for a curative instruction after hearing improper and harmful testimony from the defendants’ medical expert.")
Below is a list of criminal law Appellate Court opinions issued in January 2009:
AC29767 - State v. Hart ("On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime of assault in the second degree, (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the crimes of assault in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree, (3) the court abused its discretion in admitting the written statement of a witness as substantive evidence under the rule of State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986), and (4) the court improperly limited the questioning of a defense witness.")
AC29390 - State v. Coyne ("On appeal, the defendant asserts a number of evidentiary claims and also claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to preclude evidence of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test administered to him by the police, (2) denied his motion to preclude any evidence regarding the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration’s methods, procedures, training and scoring on standardized field sobriety tests, (3) admitted the results of the standardized field sobriety tests he took, which were not in compliance with the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration standards and (4) admitted evidence of his refusal to submit to a chemical breath test. Finally, as noted, the defendant claims that the guilty verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.")
AC29895 - State v. Nelson ("The defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his request for a continuance, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he had committed assault in the first degree, (3) the conviction of two counts of kidnapping in the first degree violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and (4) the court improperly instructed the jury with regard to the kidnapping charges.")
AC30266 - State v. Favoccia ("The defendant... appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). He claims that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state to offer certain expert testimony that allegedly bolstered the credibility of the victim in the present case.")
AC29671 - State v. Almedina ("The defendant... appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence, which he filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly dismissed his motion on the basis of collateral estoppel.")
AC29693 - State v. Lanagan ("The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly denied her motion for judgments of acquittal, (2) the court’s finding that she had violated her probation was not supported by sufficient evidence and (3) the court improperly refused to hear evidence relating to her violation of the condition of probation that she cooperate with the department of children and families (department).")
AC30388 - State v. Anderson ("On appeal, the defendant claims that the probationary period attached to his sentence for his conviction on the charge of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53-21 (a) (1) is illegal. Specifically, he claims that the court could not impose any period of probation in addition to imposing the maximum sentence on that charge and that, in imposing a ten year suspended sentence and ten years probation, the court in essence gave him a total effective sentence of twenty years on the risk of injury charge. Although the defendant misunderstands the total effective sentence imposed, in that the effective sentence is not twenty years, in exercising our plenary review, we agree with the state’s concession that the defendant lawfully could not be sentenced to more than ten years imprisonment and five years probation on the risk of injury charge. After reviewing the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that....")
AC30737 - State v. Moye ("On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of murder, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury on the murder charge, (3) the prosecutor committed reversible impropriety during the defendant’s testimony and (4) the court improperly canvassed the defendant with regard to his Alford plea to the charge of criminal possession of a pistol.")
AC29954 - State v. Acosta ("On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress a statement he made to the police, (2) the court improperly denied his Batson challenge during jury selection and (3) the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of robbery is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict finding him not guilty of charges of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-101 (a) (1), and conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-101 (a) (1).") 1/29/2010
AC29386 - Gibson v. Commissioner of Correction ("On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal and improperly determined that his trial counsel had rendered effective assistance.")
AC30369 - Griffin v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner claims that the court abused its discretion when it denied his petition for certification to appeal and improperly rejected his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a claim that his Miranda rights were violated when the police interrogated him without his attorney present after he requested that he be represented by counsel.")
AC30405, AC30814 - Velasco v. Commissioner of Correction ("The habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal. The petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that trial counsel (1) was ineffective because he failed to argue effectively an oral motion to suppress the principal eyewitness identification, (2) was ineffective in his cross-examination of that witness and (3) failed to offer expert testimony on eyewitness identification at trial.")
AC29664 - Har v. Boreiko ("This quiet title action concerns a boundary common to three parcels of land in Milford. The pro se plaintiff, Wanda I. Har, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the defendants, Dorothy S. Boreiko and Karen A. Fitzmaurice. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court’s findings with respect to her quiet title and adverse possession claims are clearly erroneous.")
Afred Chiulli & Sons, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co. - SC18398 ("The plaintiff...filed this appeal claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) found that Hanover was entitled to recover on its claim for equitable subrogation when it had not presented evidence that the subcontractors had valid claims against the plaintiff for the amounts that Hanover had paid them or that Hanover had paid the subcontractors in full; and (2) denied the plaintiff's request to amend its special defenses to Hanover's counterclaim to include an allegation that the counterclaim was barred by General Statutes § 52-576.") 1/27/2010
Wiretapping: "Wiretapping" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic communication or a communication made by cellular radio telephone by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. The normal operation of a telephone or telegraph corporation and the normal use of the services and facilities furnished by such corporation pursuant to its tariffs shall not be deemed wiretapping.
Source: General Statutes § 53a-187 (a) (1) (applies to § 53a-188, Tampering with Private Communications, and § 53a-189, Eavesdropping).
Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission - SC18319 ("Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-593a (a), a cause of action is not lost because of the expiration of a statute of limitations if process is personally delivered to a state marshal who thereafter effectuates service within thirty days of its delivery. This appeal requires us to determine whether an action can be saved pursuant to § 52-593a (a) when a party delivers the process to be served to a marshal within the applicable limitations period but then instructs the marshal to refrain from serving the process for several days. The defendant, the planning and zoning commission of the town of Wallingford, appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs, Tayco Corporation and Perry Taylor, from the defendant’s imposition of certain conditions on a zoning permit issued to the plaintiffs. The defendant claims, inter alia,that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to commence and serve their appeal within fifteen days of the published notice of the decision of the defendant pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 8-8.")
Neighborhood Builders, Inc. v. Madison - SC18083 ("The defendant, the town of Madison (town), appeals from the order of the trial court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in this action alleging violations of General Statutes §§ 7-130i and 7-148, article tenth of the Connecticut constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., arising from the town’s 'unlawful practices related to the collection, use, and allocation of [money] collected from the
[p]laintiffs and others similarly situated, under the mechanism of building permit fees.'")
Ten Connecticut Appellate Court opinions are scheduled to be released today. See the Connecticut Judicial Branch website for the list of case names and links to the full text of the opinions. After today, the opinions will be available from the Appellate Court Archive. |
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